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Exiting Paris: What the Climate
Accord Teaches About the
Features of Treaties and
Executive Agreements
Eugene Kontorovich *
In 2017, President Trump announced the United States’
intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. This
article explores why the distinction between treaties and
executive agreements cuts against treating the Accord as binding
on the United States. The Accord’s unusual features—a
protracted withdrawal period and broad multilateral structure—
preclude it having an effect as a sole executive agreement. These
features should be regarded as signs that an international
agreement is a treaty requiring Senate ratification.
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Introduction
President Barack Obama’s signing of the Paris Climate Accord 1
generated significant debate as to whether it should have been
submitted to the Senate for ratification as a treaty. 2 The debate has
focused on numerous features of the agreement, such as its creation of

*

Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.

1.

“Paris Climate Accord,” “Paris Accord,” and “Paris Agreement” will be
used interchangeably.

2.

Compare DANIEL BODANSKY, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, LEGAL OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW CLIMATE
CHANGE AGREEMENT 2 (2015), with Steven Groves, The Paris
Agreement Is a Treaty and Should Be Submitted to the Senate, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.heritage.org
/environment/report/the-paris-agreement-treaty-and-should-besubmitted-the-senate [https://perma.cc/5NZZ-9HMD].

103

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Exiting Paris

domestic obligations, 3 the treatment of prior climate agreements, 4 and
other factors. 5 President Trump’s announcement of the U.S.’s
intention to withdraw from the agreement has renewed focus on
whether Obama’s entering into the agreement bound the U.S. in the
first place. 6
This essay identifies several previously unexamined features of the
Paris Climate Accord that cut heavily against it being treated as the
kind of arrangement that can be entered into by a president on his
own authority. First, it has a four-year waiting period for withdrawal,
quite unlike traditional executive agreements. 7 Second, it is a large
multilateral deal, 8 while the typical executive agreement is bilateral.9
Moreover, the other parties to the Agreement have invariably
regarded, for the purposes of their municipal systems, as a treaty that

3.

Compare David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a
Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE
(Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climatechange-legitimate-exercise-executive-agreement-power
[https://perma.cc/CCE4-TPUY], with Michael Ramsey, Declaring the
Paris Climate Accord Unconstitutional, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 1,
2017),
https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalismblog/2017/06/declaring-the-paris-climate-accordunconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/4CET-XCVG].

4.

Brad Plumer, Past Climate Treaties Failed. So the Paris Deal Will Try
Something Radically Different, VOX (Dec. 14, 2015, 10:50 am EST),
https://www.vox.com/2015/12/14/10105422/paris-climate-deal-history
[https://perma.cc/FX82-7QAQ].

5.

Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Scientists Debate a Flaw in the Paris Climate
Agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2018, 6:00 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ climate-consensus-97-percent/2018/mar/28/climate-scientists-debate-a-flaw-in-the-paris-climateagreement [https://perma.cc/7APJ-L822].

6.

Groves, supra note 2.

7.

Paris Agreement, art. 28, Apr. 22, 2016.

8.

Robert N. Stavins & Robert C. Stowe, The Paris Agreement and
Beyond: International Climate Change Policy Post-2020, HARV.
PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, BELFER CTR. (Oct. 2016),
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/paris-agreement-and-beyondinternational-climate-change-policy-post-2020 [https://perma.cc/Q6UE3ZK6].

9.

See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATISES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON
JANUARY 1, 2018 (2018), available at https://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/282222.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JP86-D339]
(cataloguing the numerous bilateral treaties that make up most
executive agreements).
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requires domestic ratification. 10 Whatever that means for U.S.
constitutional purposes, it does suggest other countries should hardly
protest if President Trump merely follows their example and refuses
to give it legal authority in the absence of ratification. These features
– a protracted withdrawal period, and broad multilateral structure are extremely unusual, or unprecedented, for sole executive
agreements. 11 This essay explains why they go to the heart of the
treaty/executive agreement distinction.
Because of these features, President Obama’s signing of the treaty
without Senate ratification means that the Accord does not obligate
the U.S. internationally or domestically. 12 While this may seem a
moot point given President Trump’s withdrawal, it is relevant for
reasons particular to Paris, and more general ones. The announced
U.S. withdrawal generated wide criticism domestically and
internationally. 13 President Trump’s announced exit will not take
effect until a few months before the end of his term, and can be
reversed at any point before then. 14 Moreover, a future Democratic
10.

FAQs About How the Paris Agreement Enters into Force, WORLD
RESOURCES
INST’T,
https://www.wri.org/faqs-about-how-parisagreement-enters-force [https://perma.cc/FU7J-7XQ2].

11.

Eugene Kontorovich, The U.S. Can’t Quit the Paris Climate
Agreement, Because it Never Actually Joined, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
1,
2017),
https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/01/the-u-scant-quit-the-paris-climate-agreement-because-it-never-actuallyjoined/?utm_term=.294de1620eac [https://perma.cc/6YK3-WXQ6].

12.

President Trump’s announcement of the U.S. intent to withdraw from
the Agreement did not make clear whether he regarded it as binding ab
initio. However, subsequent statements by the State Department make
it clear that the U.S. is exiting the agreement pursuant to the
agreement’s own terms. This may suggest that the Trump
Administration views the deal as binding in some sense; it may also
suggest a belt-and-suspenders approach, where the Administration does
not wish to resolve the constitutional issues involved and exits in
conformity with the accord’s provisions to cover all possible legal bases.
See Communication Regarding Intent To Withdraw From Paris
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Aug.
4,
2017),
Agreement,
U.S.
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm
[https://perma.cc/EF2Q-YM6M].

13.

Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris
Climate Deal, Sparking Criticism at Home and Abroad, WASH. POST
(June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-toannounce-us-will-exit-paris-climate-deal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.010d29fb4dd5
[https://perma.cc/7WJ4-5QW6].

14.

Chelsea Harvey, Withdrawing from the Paris Deal Takes Four Years.
Our Next President Could Join Again in 30 days., WASH. POST (June 5,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/06/05/withdrawing-from-the-paris-deal-takes-
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president is likely to promptly “rejoin” the Accord, but again without
the Senate’s advice and consent. None of these actions would, this
essay argues, make the Accord binding on the U.S. Moreover,
ambitious multilateral agreements will likely become more common
for environmental and other matters in the foreseeable future. The
Senate will likely remain reluctant to ratify them, and thus presidents
will more frequently seek to enter into such agreements through their
authority to make executive agreements. In short, the Paris Accord is
the first but not last of such attempts. This essay identifies several
features that such executive agreements cannot have; that is, features
that would require an agreement to be submitted to the Senate before
it could have legal effect.
Part I of this essay briefly sketches the constitutional distinction
between treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole
executive agreements. Part II examines the Paris Accord’s uniquely
onerous withdrawal provisions and shows why they preclude treating
it as a SEA. Part III examines the Paris Agreement’s multilateral
nature and shows how it does not accord with the past practice for
SEAs.

I. The Role of Executive Agreements
The Constitution allows the president to “make Treaties,” subject
to the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. 15 Such treaties fully bind
the U.S. and have a domestic status equivalent to statutes. 16 At the
same time, it is well accepted that there is a class of international
agreements that the president can commit the U.S. to without
invoking the treaty process. 17 Indeed, the vast majority of America’s
international agreements are not made through the constitutional
treaty process. 18 Such agreements are of two kinds. “Congressionalfour-years-our-next-president-could-join-again-in-30days/?utm_term=.9b4548a4f240 [https://perma.cc/BK8P-3WTA].
15.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

16.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

17.

STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW
6–8 (2018). In international law, the term “treaty” is one of the many
terms for a binding international agreement, none of which are legally
significant. In international law, an agreement, however denominated, is
binding. Not all agreements that are “treaties” in the international law
sense – i.e., that create a binding international obligation – are
“Treaties” in the constitutional sense. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (applying to
treaties).

18.

Curtis Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE
L. J. 1615, 1626 (2018).
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executive agreements” are entered into by the president pursuant to
legislative authorization. 19 While they are not ratified by two-thirds of
the Senate, they have a different kind of supermajority support—
majorities in both houses of Congress. 20 Given the broad authorities of
the president and Congress in matters of foreign trade and policy,
such agreements are not controversial. 21
Finally, presidents have entered into many agreements without
invoking the treaty process or congressional authorization. 22 However,
the constitutionally permissible scope of the “sole executive
agreement” (“SEA”) category is a matter of great dispute. 23 Such
agreements are typically justified by the president’s invocation of his
inherent constitutional powers, such as recognition and foreign
relations, or as commander-in-chief. 24 They typically deal with lowlevel bilateral issues of cooperation and take the form of exchanges of
letters, memoranda of understanding, and the like. 25 While the use of
SEAs is both venerable and vast, the precise line between what
international agreements can be entered into by the president on his
own authority and those that require congressional action remains
vague.
For most purposes, SEAs are not controversial. Yet important
agreements raise the issue of the constitutionally permissible scope
and effect of SEAs. Scholars have suggested that the distinction
19.

Id. at 1625.

20.

John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties: The Constitutionality of CongressionalExecutive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (2000).

21.

See Congressional-Executive Agreement, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(June
5, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/congressionalexecutive-agreement
[https://perma.cc/GU86-JFW9]
(defining
congressional-executive agreements). As a textual matter, the
Constitution recognizes the existence of agreements other than Art. III
“Treaties” – in particular, the “compacts” and “agreements” that states
can enter into with congressional consent. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10.
cl. 3.

22.

See Daniel Bodansky & Peter J. Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 887 (2016) (defining a new type of
agreement known as executive-agreements+, distinct from other types of
international agreements). Some scholars have gone so far as to argue
that the Paris Agreement represents an exotic and previously
unidentified species of international deals that fall between
congressional-executive agreements and SEAs. Id.

23.

See MULLIGAN, supra note 17, at 7–9 (demonstrating the Supreme
Court’s determination on whether the President has authority to enter
agreements in certain contexts).

24.

See Id. at 7–8 (delineating where the President has exclusive
constitutional authority).

25.

See Id. at 8 (discussing two prior agreements handling assets assignment
and ending US involvement in Vietnam).
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between treaties and SEAs lies in the “length and importance of the
agreement.” 26 As this essay shows, the Paris Climate Accord differs in
kind and degree from prior SEAs on both these criteria, and instead
looks more like a treaty.
While there are no clear rules about the treaty/executive
agreement, the Paris Accord has some features, not yet analyzed in
this context, that do not follow the pattern of past SEAs. Simply
pointing out that there are such things as SEAs does not mean the
Paris Accord is one of them, given that it departs from the SEA
model in significant ways.

II. Delayed Withdrawal provisions in Executive
Agreements
One formal feature of the Paris Climate Accord distinguishes it
from the extensive past use of SEAs—the withdrawal provision. This
Part shows that distinction has constitutional significance and places
the Paris Accord outside the accepted constitutional scope of SEAs.
The Paris Accord has a four-year delayed exit period: at the time
the agreement comes into force, a state party to the deal can only
withdraw after four years. 27 There is no constitutional limit on
delayed withdrawal periods in treaties 28—ten years is the standard
waiting period under U.S. bilateral investment treaties. 29 However,
typical withdrawal periods are much shorter. 30 Most treaties do not
provide for any waiting period for withdrawal. 31 However, the Vienna
26.

Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty power,
77 N.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 133, 184 (1998).

27.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENT TRUMP’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS
AGREEMENT RAISES LEGAL QUESTIONS: PART 1 (2017). The actual
withdrawal period requires one-year notice; but no withdrawal is
permitted at all for the first three years after the agreement comes into
force. In practice, the earliest permitted withdrawal for the U.S. under
the terms of the Agreement is Nov. 4, 2016, the day after the next U.S.
presidential election. Id.

28.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV.., R44761, WITHDRAWAL FROM
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS
AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 1 (2018) (“Although
the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the Executive
has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated.”).

29.

Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World 19 (Org. for
Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper No. 02, 2015). Indeed,
almost all BITs have an initial 10-year limitation on withdraw, followed
by waiting periods that are 12.5 years on average. Id.

30.

Kontorovich, supra note 11.

31.

Id.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties provides one year as a default
withdrawal period for treaties containing no explicit withdrawal
provisions. 32 But many treaties do have such terms—almost
invariably shorter than four years. 33 Indeed, six months or a year are
the most common waiting periods. 34
However, withdrawal provisions for SEAs look quite different. In
that context, the Paris Accord restrictions are truly remarkable, and
go far beyond the kind of “thin” agreement allowed under sole
executive authority. The justification of SEAs is that they are an
inherent part of a president’s foreign affairs powers because the
conduct of foreign affairs requires the frequent formal arrangements
between countries. 35 But he can also unmake them as needed. 36
Indeed, the “temporary” nature of executive agreements has long
been seen as one of their defining and self-limiting features.37
President Theodore Roosevelt took the view that an SEA does not
even bind the signing president’s successors unless explicitly
renewed. 38 While extensive usage appears to reject that strong
position, there is also no support for its converse—that an SEA can
bind or restrict the ability of a successor to exit it. 39
A protracted withdrawal period in an SEA would allow one
president to unilaterally pre-commit his successor and limit the
latter’s powers. Such action could be deliberate. Numerous news
accounts suggest that the Paris Agreement’s four-year period was not
accidental. 40 Rather, it was specifically designed to block U.S. exit in
32.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.

33.

Kontorovich, supra note 11.

34.

Id.

35.

MULLIGAN, supra note 17, at 7–8.

36.

Bradley, supra note 18, at 1626.

37.

See Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-a Reply, 54
YALE L. REV. 616, 640-41 (1945) (demonstrating the over 70 years of
acceptance that Presidents can unilaterally withdraw from SEAs).

38.

F.M. Brewer, Executive Agreements, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS
(1943),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1943070100
[https://perma.cc/4XQY-VVRD].

39.

Borchard, supra note 37 (“The successor cannot be bound by the
executive agreements of his predecessor”).

40.

Tim McDonnell, Have We Solved Climate Change Yet?, SLATE (Apr. 22,
2016),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/04/signing-the-parisagreement-is-one-small-step-forward-for-fighting-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/WW5D-5X2J]; see also Brian Palmer, Is America
Actually Out of the Paris Agreement?, NRDC (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/america-actually-out-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/DT32-XX2R].
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the event of a possible Republican presidential victory in 2016. 41
Indeed, the narrow window for the U.S. exit President Trump seeks
to employ (from Nov. 4, 2020 until the inauguration of the next
president) may largely have been an unintended consequence of the
Agreement receiving the necessary number of ratifications to enter
into effect faster than had been expected. 42
This is not to say the motives of an agreement’s drafters in
crafting the withdrawal provision should determine whether it can be
entered into by the U.S. as an SEA. Rather, it demonstrates the
sound policy reasons for restricting the scope of SEAs—whose
constitutional basis is already less than pellucid—to agreements that
can be conveniently exited by a successor administration. To be sure,
this leaves open the question of how long an acceptable withdrawal
period can be. Even a year-long waiting period can limit the
discretion of a successor if entered into in the last days of the prior
administration. As with many constitutional questions of time limits,
the question does not admit of a bright-line answer. 43 In practice, the
vast precedent of past SEAs should serve as useful guides, and as will
be seen, the four-year period is far outside accepted norms. 44
An examination of many executive agreements from various
decades shows that withdrawal periods longer than a year are quite
extraordinary. From 1928 to 1945, the State Department published
executive agreements in a separate collection, the Executive
Agreements Series. 45 While obviously containing older agreements,
this collection does not require winnowing agreements from treaties. A
search of the entire collection found no agreement with a withdrawal

41.

McDonnell, supra note 40; see also Palmer, supra note 40.

42.

See Palmer, supra note 40 (explaining how the Paris Agreement seemed
designed to prevent right-leaning, leaders from exiting the agreement
during their tenure).

43.

See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 451–53 (1939) (holding that the
time period a constitutional amendment remains open for ratification is
non-justiciable, because there is no judicial method of determining what
is too short or too long a time period). For this reason, the Court has
treated analogous time-limit questions as non-justiciable political
questions. Id.

44.

See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 258-59 (2009) (arguing
that agreements that do not allow withdraw for a period of more than
one year should not be entered into as SEAs, but rather as some kind of
congressional-executive agreement).

45.

Finding
Agreements,
U.S.
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/text/
9WS5].
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period longer than six months, with thirty days being perhaps the
most common time period. 46
To examine whether more recent agreements have lengthier
withdrawal provisions, I compiled a list of all SEAs in 2008, 2009,
2016, and 2017— the two most recent years at the time the research
was conducted, and two prior years picked for convenience. 47 The
agreements made in these years had a variety of withdrawal
provisions ranging from one month to a year, but none longer than
one year. 48 Based on my findings, the average for 87 agreements in
2008 was 137 days; 165 days in 2008, and 226 days in 2016. 49 Thus, it
seems the most common withdrawal notice requirement in SEAs is
half a year; durations longer than one year may be unprecedented.
One might argue that entering into a SEA with a protracted
withdraw period does not limit subsequent presidents, because as a
matter of domestic authority, they can always quit a SEA, even in
violation of the agreement’s provisions. But this would breach
international commitments, making it harder in practice for the
subsequent president to use his undisputed executive authority.
Indeed, this is precisely the argument many made against Trump’s
exit of the Paris Accords – that it breaches U.S. obligations. His
adherence to the withdrawal provision period underscores how
significant a constraint such agreements are, and the need for
congressional authorization in such cases.
Such deep commitment cannot be made without the involvement
of the Senate. This quite unusual feature of President Obama’s
agreement strongly suggests it cannot be treated as an SEA, and thus
it has no force until the Senate ratifies it.

II. Multilateral Nature and Other Parties’ Practice
This Part deals with several aspects of the multilateral structure
of the Paris Accord. Firstly, the multilateral nature of the agreement
46.

Eugene Kontorovich, Collection of SEAs from 2008-09 and 2016-17,
available
at
https://perma.cc/JTQ3-KLS9
[hereinafter
SEA
Spreadsheet].

47.

See id. The State Department publishes all U.S. international
agreements, in a collection known as Texts of International Agreements
to Which the United States is a Party. This collection makes no
distinction between treaties, SEAs, and congressional-executive
agreements. That distinction is only sometimes clear from the titles, and
even the text of the agreements, and thus examining SEAs particularly
requires individually identifying them by determining whether they were
submitted to the Senate. Finding Agreements, supra note 45.

48.

See SEA Spreadsheet, supra note 46.

49.

Id.
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is itself exceptional for SEAs. Moreover, the Paris Accord is a
particular type of multilateral agreement—one held open for
membership to all states of the world, and contemplating universal
participation. 50 To facilitate this, the U.N. Secretary General serves as
the depositary for the agreement. 51 All these features correlate
strongly with the importance and breadth of the agreement, and thus
point towards constitutional treaty status. Moreover, these factors are
fairly formal, and thus well-suited to a legal test that must make a
binary distinction between SEAs and other agreements. Finally, the
other Paris Accord signatories have overwhelmingly approached it as
an agreement requiring domestic ratification processes. 52 While not
strictly relevant to its U.S. constitutional status, the fact that
apparently only the U.S. entered into it as an executive agreement is
certainly noteworthy, and at least is relevant to whether an American
exit can legitimately be seen by other nations as a breach of
international commitments.
A.

Formal Structure of the Agreement

The difference between broad multilateral treaties and bilateral
agreements is recognized in international law, 53 as well as U.S. foreign
relations practice. 54 Multilateral obligation also correlates strongly
with the scope, duration, and importance of the obligation being
undertaken. 55 One indication that multilateral treaties are “bigger
deals” is the far lower ratification rates they enjoy in the Senate. 56
50.

What is the Paris Agreement?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/processand-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/S5DT-D3ZC] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).

51.

FAQs, supra note 10.

52.

Id.

53.

See Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 60, Jan. 27, 1980,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (distinguishing the difference between breach of a
bilateral treaty versus a multilateral treaty).

54.

See Brett Schaefer, The Role and Relevance of Multilateral Diplomacy
in U.S. Foreign Policy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 14, 2011),
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-role-and-relevancemultilateral-diplomacy-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/9NQG-H4JN]
(discussing the importance of difference diplomatic approaches to
multilateral versus bilateral treaties).

55.

Jeffery S. Peake & Glen S. Krutz, President Barack Obama,
Partisanship, and the Politics of International Agreement, 1 SSRN J. 16
(Aug.
1,
2014),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587806
[https://perma.cc/T8ZG-5DNE] (“Multilateral treaties, by their nature,
typically involve more significant and controversial issues, including
human rights, arms control, and the environment.”).

56.

See Johannes Thimm, The United States and Multilateral Treaties, in
THE UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL TREATIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 1
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Most, if not all the past practice supporting executive agreements
consists of exchanges of notes and settlement agreements – all of
which are bilateral. 57 Certainly such agreements were almost entirely
bilateral until the 20th century, as multilateral agreements of any kind
were quite rare until then. 58
Multilateral executive agreements remain exceedingly rare, and
perhaps unprecedented, according to several studies. 59 Moreover, these
studies do not distinguish between SEAs and congressional-executive
agreements, making it unclear if there is any precedent for broad
multilateral SEAs. 60 To be sure, some important multilateral
treaties—for example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement—
have not been submitted to the Senate, but were done pursuant to
explicit congressional grants of authority and not as SEAs. 61
(2016) (“More often than not, America remains outside of multilateral
treaties, including some that enjoy almost universal membership
otherwise.”).
57.

MULLIGAN, supra note 17 at 7–9

58.

BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY
ANALYSIS VOL. 1, 3 (Simon Lester et al. eds., 2016).

59.

See JEFFREY S. PEAKE & GLEN S. KURTZ, TREATY POLITICS AND THE
RISE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A
SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 90 (University of Michigan Press eds.,
2009) (finding that the “baseline probability of a . . . multilateral
agreement being a treaty is .63” and that multilateral nature is by far
the biggest predictor of an agreement being a treaty rather than an
executive agreement); see also S. Rep. No. 106-71, at 42 (reporting that
multilateral treaties represent a much smaller share of executive
agreements (4.6%) than of Senate-submitted treaties).

60.

See Mark Bond, The Minamata Convention and the Paris Climate
Agreement: Insights Into Senate-less Adoption, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Feb.
16,
2015),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/02/16/theminamata-convention-and-the-paris-climate-agreement-insights-intosenate-less-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/M4GB-FLHX] (discussing how
the Minamata Convention is somewhere between a sole-executive and
congressional-executive agreements). But see Bodansky, supra note 22,
at 910-11 (noting that the Minamata Convention may properly be
understood as a congressional-executive agreement).

61.

See JANE M. SMITH ET AL. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, WHY
CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONALEXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES 1 (2013) (discussing
how the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) and
the Trade Act of 1974 granted the President authority to enter tariff
and nontariff trade barrier agreements.). Status of forces agreements
provide a telling example. These are among the most well accepted
contexts for sole executive agreements, relying in part on the
Commander-in-Chief authority. The NATO SOFA is the only
multilateral one to which the U.S. is a party, and it is also the only such
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Multilateralism is of course a matter of degree. 62 As a matter of
principle, it would be hard to justify a constitutional distinction
between bilateral, and say, trilateral executive SEAs. After that of
course, everything is a matter of degree. But the Paris Accord is a
particular kind of ultra-multilateral agreement. It is a “universal”
agreement - which international law recognizes is qualitatively, not
just quantitively, different from agreements that happen to have
multiple parties. 63 A “plurilateral treaty” is one that is open to
numerous members, but from a limited set of countries with a
particular interest in a certain matter, for example, sharing of natural
resources in a lake or a mutual defense agreement. 64 On the other
hand, the Paris Agreement and other major modern multilateral
agreements seek “universal participation.” 65 When an agreement aims
at full participation, this is seen as an essential part of its character. 66
Such treaties are, because of their subject matter and broad
regulatory aims, more ambitious than other agreements. 67
It is important to note another related formal trapping of the
Paris Agreement—the role of the U.N. Secretary General as
depositary. 68
The Secretary General only accepts this role for
“multilateral treaties of worldwide interest” and treaties open
agreement to have submitted to the Senate as a treaty. See R. CHUCK
MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34531, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT (SODA): WHAT IS IT AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1-2
(2009).
62.

Joseph S. Nye, America Can’t Go It Alone: Unilateralism vs.
(June
13,
2002),
Multilateralism,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/13/opinion/IHT-america-cant-go-italone-unilateralism-vs-multilateralism.html
[https://perma.cc/F74RJ4XQ].

63.

See Naghmeh Nasirtousi & Karin Bäckstrand, International Climate
Politics in the post-Paris era, NORDIC ECON. POLICY R. (forthcoming
April 2019) (describing the Paris Agreement as “a new model of ‘hybrid
multilateralism’…”).

64.

PROF. DR. RAYMOND SANER, PLURILATERAL AGREEMENTS: KEY TO
SOLVING IMPASSE OF WTO/DOHA ROUND AND BASIS FOR FUTURE TRADE
AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE WTO CONTEXT 3-5 (2012).

65.

EMILY O’BRIAN & RICHARD GOWEN, WHAT MAKES INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS WORK: DEFINING FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 4 (2012).

66.

See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 51, at 10
(May 28,) (noting as relevant to the treaty’s interpretation “the clearly
universal character of the United Nations under whose auspices the
Convention was concluded, and the very wide degree of participation
envisaged by Article XI of the Convention.”).

67.

O’BRIAN & GOWAN, supra note 65, at 31.

68.
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114

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Exiting Paris

generally to membership, such as those negotiated at U.N.
conferences. 69 Thus, the Paris Agreement is among the “most”
multilateral kinds of treaties. 70 It is not clear if the U.S. has even used
an executive agreement to join any multilateral treaty of which the
Secretary General serves as the depositary. 71 Current State
Department guidelines about what constitutes a treaty and what an
SEA (known as Circular 175) list numerous criteria for determining
which agreements should be treated as treaties, such as past U.S.
practice with similar agreements, the general international practice
with similar agreements, the degree of formality, and so forth. 72 All of
these factors, as applied to universal multilateral treaties, point
towards treating the Paris Accords as a treaty. That is, other
universal agreements have always been regarded by the U.S. as
treaties for constitutional purposes.
One of the fundamental difficulties in policing the treaty/SEA
line is that while there is broad agreement on numerous relevant
factors, there is no test for how many of them are needed and how
they are balanced. 73 Moreover, many of the Circular 175 factors
themselves are qualitative in nature. 74 It may be that the universal
multilateral nature of an agreement would serve as a good, formal
test—a rule of inclusion, not exclusion—for which agreements should
be regarded as treaties.
B.

Other Parties Treat it as a Treaty

The fundamental American exceptionalism with regards to the
Paris Accord lies not in President Trump’s decision to exit, but in
President Obama’s decision to not seek ratification. The U.S. appears
to be alone in its “non-treaty” interpretation. 75 The signatory states
69.

Off. of Legal Aff., Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 at 7.
(1999).

70.

See JOSEPH ALDY ET AL., THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND BEYOND:
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020 1 (2016) (noting
that the Paris Agreement is “a breakthrough in multilateral efforts…”).

71.

See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Participant Search: United States of
America).

72.
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(Feb.
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2002),
https://www.state.gov/s/l/38636.htm [https://perma.cc /U59Z-V427]
(discussing the factors to consider when entering treaties).
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Groves, supra note 2.

74.

OF
STATE,
Circular
DEP’T
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/
QQ9Q].

75.

Groves, supra note 2.

115

175
Procedure,
[https://perma.cc/Q4J6-

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Exiting Paris

seem invariably to have accepted the Paris Agreement as a treaty
that requires going through their internal treaty-ratification processes,
typically made by submission to the legislature. 76 The United
Kingdom, China, and Jamaica have ratified it through their
legislatures, and so has Brazil, Japan,
the Philippines, and
Australia. 77 In the latter, the question of whether it was a binding
international accord requiring submission to Parliament received some
discussion, and a parliamentary analysis concluded it was a “major
treaty” that needed to be submitted. 78 While this essay does not
examine all 180 current ratifications of the Agreement, it seems to
have overwhelmingly gone through domestic processes for treaties
rather than processes for agreements.
The universal interpretation of the Agreement as a treaty cuts
against President Obama’s insistence that it is not one. A treaty is an
international agreement, and in a multilateral treaty, the views of
other signatories are at least probative of the question of whether it
creates binding obligations upon ratification. Indeed, the State
Department practice treats “general international practice as to
similar agreements” —whether they are regarded as treaties or not—
as a relevant factor in the domestic determination. 79 This certainly
implies that “international practice” as to the specific agreement in
question would be highly relevant.
To be sure, the question of what kind of agreements must be
submitted to the Senate is not governed by a foreign country’s rules
about treaty ratification—the meaning of the U.S. Constitution is
determined endogenously, not by reference to other countries’
constitutional practices. 80 In particular the U.S. definition of “treaty”
for constitutional purposes is considerably narrower than the
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77.

See Paris Agreement Ratification Tracker, CLIMATE ANALYTICS (2017),
https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/ratification-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/QM3F-4JTP] (listing all countries who have ratified
the Paris Agreement).

78.

See generally Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, Report 163, Paris Agreement, Kyoto
Protocol - Doha Amendment (Nov. 2016) (outlining the discussion
about the ratification of the Paris Agreement through the Australian
Parliament).
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definition of “treaty” in international law. 81 The definition in various
other countries’ constitutions may also be broader or narrower. So it
is not the other country’s decision to seek legislative ratification that
is relevant, but rather the view that it creates binding international
commitments.
However, when the Constitution incorporates international legal
terms of art—such as in the “Treaty” Clause 82—it may incorporate
international law by reference, with respect to those specific
provisions. 83 Thus from the earliest cases, courts have looked to
international law for the purpose of distinguishing treaties from other
agreements. 84 The writings of Emmerich de Vattel, the international
law author most familiar to the Framers, 85 have played a large role in
these discussions. 86 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
international legal trappings of an agreement are relevant to the
constitutional treaty-sole executive agreement distinction. 87 Yet this
essay does not intend to argue that international law conclusively
determines what constitutes a constitutional “treaty,” because
overwhelming precedent establishes that constitutional category to be
far narrower than the international legal one. 88
Thus while the treatment by other signatories of the Paris
Agreement as may not be strictly relevant for constitutional purposes,
it is nonetheless useful for understanding the nature of the U.S.’s
international obligations under the Agreement. Some have argued
81.

See S. Prt. 106-71, at 1 (2001) (“However, the word treaty does not
have the same meaning in the United States and in international law.
Under international law, a ‘treaty’ is any legally binding agreement
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agreement that is made ‘by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate…’”).
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(2009) (discussing whether the incorporation of international law by
specific constitutional provisions which use international law terms of
art fixes the content of that law as it stood in 1789, or allows it to track
changes in international law).
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See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 571 (1840) (“For when we speak of
‘a treaty,’ we mean an instrument written and executed with the
formalities customary among nations . . . .”).
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that even if President Trump’s non-acceptance of obligations under
the Agreement would be consistent with the Constitution, it would be
a breach of an international obligation and weaken foreign trust in
U.S. commitments. 89 Yet foreign countries are in no place to complain
if the U.S. insists on treating the Agreement as a treaty requiring
submission to the legislature because that is exactly how they have
treated it themselves. 90 Knowing that the Agreement was not ratified
by the U.S. Senate , they should not expect the U.S. to be bound, as
they would not regard themselves bound under similar circumstances.

Conclusion
President Trump did not quit the Paris Accord because the U.S.
was never in it in the first place. Several features of the Agreement,
such as its extensive withdrawal delay time and its strong multilateral
structure, distinguish it functionally and formally from past SEAs. A
future president who rejoins Paris will be in the same position
President Obama was in: at least as a matter of domestic
constitutional law, he will not have committed the U.S.
Looking forward, the difficulty of the U.S. constitutional treaty
process makes it quite likely that future presidents will be tempted to
enter into broad, long-lasting multilateral commitments in areas such
as environmental regulation through SEAs. 91 This is particularly
tempting because the constitutional limits on SEAs are fuzzy. But the
Paris Agreement’s extremely long withdrawal period, along with its
structure as broad multilateral U.N. treaty, clearly distinguish it from
past executive agreements, and require it to be treated as a treaty to
have domestic effect.
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